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Transnational Policy Networks and the Role of Advocacy Scientists: 
From Ozone Layer Protection to Climate Change 
by Reiner Grundmann∗ 
International regulations for the protection of the 
ozone layer seem to be effective. The Montreal Pro-
tocol (MP) is a much celebrated success story in 
international environmental policy making, and 
rightly so. The Montreal Protocol served as a role 
model and trigger for the climate change dispute. 
Regarding the environmental threat posed by climate 
change and ozone depletion and their public percep-
tion, it has been observed that ‘the ozone hole has 
arrived as a concept in the US public’s consciousness, 
but the greenhouse effect is entering primarily as a 
subset of the ozone hole phenomenon, the closest 
model available.’ (Kempton et al. 1995). But so far, 
climate change negotiations have not quite moved 
onto a similar path of successful environmental gov-
ernance. To be sure, the failure of reaching an agree-
ment in The Hague in November 2000 was followed 
by a compromise in Bonn in July 2001 and further 
progress in Marrakech. However, the fact that the 
United States has withdrawn from the Kyoto Proto-
col highlights the serious obstacles that climate 
change policy faces. Comparing the landmark agree-
ment of the Montreal Protocol with the Kyoto Proc-
ess, the latter pales in effectiveness.228 What are the 
reasons? There is a preliminary and obvious answer. 
As one commentator put it, ‘perhaps one reason why 
expectations were so high [in the climate change case] 
is the success of negotiating the Montreal Protocol… 
Environmental NGOs and negotiators moved from 
ozone to climate change, many of them expecting the 
second shot to be much like the first one.’ (Ted Ha-
nisch quoted in Rowlands 1995: 259). But is that all 
one can say? 
From Kyoto to The Hague: Deadlock 
After the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (FCCC) was passed in Rio, it took several 
years before the international community agreed in 
1997 to a protocol of binding measures in Kyoto. In 
the protocol, the industrialised nations pledged that 
they would by 2008-2012 reduce their emissions of 
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greenhouse gases by 5% based on 1990 levels. The 
countries with the highest emissions committed 
themselves to a reduction of 6-8%. This was a start-
ing point which, however, does not yet come close to 
the range of reductions which would have to be put 
in place if climate change were to be prevented. Ac-
cording to scientists working with the IPCC, carbon 
dioxide emissions would have to be cut by more than 
60% in order to stabilise climate on present-day levels 
(Houghton et al. 1990; Wuebbles and Rosenberg 
1998). 
In the run-up to the Kyoto Protocol the participants 
found themselves in a deadlock: on the one side were 
countries willing to take action, on the other were 
countries against. Among the first group was the EU, 
among the second countries like the US, Canada, 
Australia, and Japan (later known as the ‘umbrella 
group’) but also developing countries. The opponents 
of  strict regulations used scientific uncertainty as an 
argument to legitimise their reluctance.229 In Kyoto, a 
compromise was reached which mandated targets and 
timetables, leaving the implementation (including 
“flexible mechanisms”) to further talks. In the run-up 
to the talks in The Hague, the EU and the umbrella 
group found themselves in a different kind of  dead-
lock (with the developing world standing aside, for 
the time being): both disagreed about the extent to 
which flexible mechanisms should be allowed to 
reduce emissions. At The Hague, EU countries and 
the United States did not seem to disagree heavily 
over the reality of  human-made climate change and 
the need of  mitigation, but over the best way to 
achieve this goal, or--to stick with the official lan-
guage--to maintain the ‘integrity of  the Kyoto proto-
col’.230 The EU accused the umbrella group, especially 
the United States and Canada, of  trying to exploit 
loopholes. The positions were not based on different 
229  In the US, groups such as the Global Climate Coalition, 
Citizens for a Sound Economy, Western Fuels Association or 
the American Petroleum Institute funded skeptical scientists 
who attacked findings of  the intergovernmental panel on cli-
mate change, IPCC (see Balling 1992, Michaels et al. 1995; 
Singer 1996). 
230  Before the start of the conference in The Hague, a consensus 
was reached on what previously was a contentious issue: 
whether climate change exists at all. Most players seemed to 
agree that the Earth is warming up and that this will eventually 
have negative impacts on ecosystems and society unless gov-
ernments take action now to reduce emissions of carbon diox-
ide. It seems as if the US has now moved away from this con-
sensus. 
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scientific models or different orientations in principle: 
both sides agreed that something had to be done in 
order to mitigate climate change. It was a matter of  
agreeing on the appropriate measures where the 
conflicts arose.231 Interestingly, the advocates of  the 
environment were divided (as was industry) with 
some US environmentalists supporting flexible 
mechanisms (such as carbon trading and reforesta-
tion) proposed by their government.232 On the other 
side there were more radical environmentalists sup-
porting the position of  EU countries who suspected 
the United States to aim at a cheap deal. 
Over the course of  the last decade, the US reluctance 
has wavered between a principled objection to a cli-
mate treaty as such and an acceptance of  it provided 
that the perceived burden on the US economy was 
kept at a moderate level. Presidents Bush Sr. and Jr. 
exemplify the first position, the Clinton administra-
tion the second. Clinton and Gore were expressing 
clear endorsement of  the IPCC recommendations.233 
The problem was that they were held hostage by the 
US Senate that made it clear before Kyoto that they 
would not agree to binding greenhouse gas (GHG) 
reductions and subsequently did not ratify the Kyoto 
protocol (Harrison 2000). Therefore, the reluctant 
approach shown in Kyoto and the insistence on flexi-
ble mechanisms by the US delegation in The Hague 
reflects the fact that the US representatives (the offi-
cial delegation, but also some environmentalists) 
think it is in the best interest of  their country to use 
flexible mechanisms because they are cheaper and 
impose a lighter burden upon the US economy. They 
fear that a more rigorous approach would meet stiff  
domestic resistance. The leader of  the US delegation 
in The Hague, Loy, put it this way: ‘Nations can only 
negotiate abroad what they believe they can ratify at 
home’ (The Washington Post 26 November 2000). This 
raises the question of  why the US (at least from a 
European perspective)234 was and still is less prepared 
                                                          
                                                                                   
231  Ott (2001) has argued that the complexity of the issues on the 
negotiating table and a lack of leadership were to blame pri-
marily for the breakdown in The Hague. 
232  Eileen Claussen, president of the Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change said: ‘In the long-term fight against global 
warming, we need every tool at our disposal… If we take car-
bon sequestration and market mechanisms out of the equa-
tion, or bog them down with such overly restrictive rules that 
nobody uses them, then we are limiting our ability to meet our 
environmental objectives.’ (New York Times, 26 November 
2000). 
233  In his address on July 3, 1997 to the United Nations General 
Assembly Special Session, President Clinton noted that ‘the 
science is clear and compelling’ and wanted the United States 
to take a strong leadership role on climate change. In the 
autumn of 1997, Clinton’s administration also instigated a 
campaign to build public support for the Kyoto treaty (Kros-
nick et al. 2000). 
234  Americans rightly point out that there is something hypocriti-
cal about the EU’s position. The UK and Germany were the 
to commit itself  to stringent goals compared to the 
EU (Grubb 1999; Harrison 2000). 
An obvious answer to this is the fact that US citizens 
have become accustomed to a lifestyle much more 
energy intensive compared to the rest of  the world. 
Given the contemporary technostructure (fossil-fuel 
intense), this translates into higher levels of  fuel con-
sumption. In fact, per capita emissions of  carbon 
dioxide are among the highest in the US—they are 
almost five times the global average (only Luxem-
bourg and three small oil-producing countries exceed 
US per capita carbon emissions). 
It would therefore require regulatory efforts on the 
part of  the US government in order to increase en-
ergy efficiency. Such measures would probably in-
clude taxation which is not going to be very popular. 
This then raises the next question: why has the build 
up of  public attention in the US been slow and weak? 
Here I will argue that in contrast to the ozone case, 
the advocates for regulation did not achieve what they 
aimed at. 
The role of  public attention 
In order to do so, I shall focus on the work of the 
IPCC and its effects on the policy process. The ar-
gument will be made that the architects of the IPCC 
may have drawn the wrong lessons from the ozone 
case. My starting point is a statement from the late 
Austrian diplomat and negotiator during the talks for 
the Montreal Protocol, Winfried Lang. He described 
the confrontation during these negotiations between 
the (then progressive) US delegation and the (then 
reluctant) European Community in the following 
way: 
During the negotiations on the ozone layer it was the 
US-delegation, which by means of continuous contacts 
with the media tried to build up a climate of public ex-
pectations which should induce still reluctant delega-
tions (mainly those with EC-membership) to agree to 
substantial reductions of emissions. Further research 
will tell us, whether the relatively flexible stance finally 
adopted by the European Community was brought 
about by this manipulation of public opinion from the 
outside or rather by an internal process of rethinking 
threats and options. (Lang 1994: 175). 
The roles have been reversed but we are watching the 
same play, aren’t we? Not exactly, since the EC, for a 
long time, did not take a leadership role and did not 
do very much to build up a climate of public expecta-
 
only two countries that made significant progress in reducing 
CO2 emissions. This was largely the product of fortuitous cir-
cumstances (the shut down of mining in the UK and the 
breakdown of the East German economy after unification in 
1990).  
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tion. The expectations raised by the media in the 
ozone case have in fact been much higher in the US 
than in the EC countries. Taking the example of the 
German press, in the weeks before the Montreal 
Protocol was passed there were only two reports on 
the topic in the German press, compared to eight 
articles in the New York Times alone (Grundmann 
2001). Let us see if this correlation between a coun-
try’s active policy and high expectations in the rele-
vant public sphere235 also applies to the climate con-
ferences. 
Conducting an online database research in Lexis®-
Nexis® Executive, I compared media attention about 
climate change in selected countries (see Table 1 for 
an overview). I limited the search to German, UK 
and US media attention.236 The search was performed 
for the periods leading up to and including major 
international negotiations: Berlin, 7 March-8 April 
1995; Kyoto, 15 November-15 December 1997; The 
Hague, 1-30 November 2000; Bonn, 1-31 July 2001. 
237  
Comparing absolute numbers of media reports in 
these three countries, US news reports score very 
high, especially around the Kyoto meeting (see table 
1-1). However, the numbers of newspapers included 
in Lexis-Nexis vary across countries. Compared to 
German sources, US sources are represented at a 
much higher proportion (by a factor of 20). In order 
to avoid this imbalance, I calculated the relative val-
ues, dividing absolute numbers of news reports by 
the number of news outlets. Relative data reveal the 
paramount attention paid by Germany news outlets 
compared to both the UK and US. However, even 
this ‘correction’ of data has to be treated with cau-
tion. The Lexis-Nexis database seems to change over 
time, so it might not be internally consistent (see the 
Italian and Spanish data in Table 1-1). Apart from 
                                                          
235  There is a difference between public opinion (as measured, 
e.g., through polls) and media attention (Gamson and Modi-
gliani 1989). I chose to use the latter as an indicator of the 
agenda setting activities related to the policy process (cf. 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Mazur 1998; The Social Learn-
ing Group 2001). One reason for doing so is that elites listen 
more carefully to the published opinion as compared to the 
public opinion (they cannot ignore unpleasant news as easily 
as they can poll data). What is more, in most cases, media se-
lection of issues predates public preoccupation. As eminent 
sociologist Luhmann noted, ‘everything we know about our 
society, about the world we live in, we know from the mass 
media’ (Luhmann 1996: 9). Mazur (1998: 459) asserts that 
‘public worry and government action rise and fall with the 
quantity of news coverage’. 
236  Including all European languages would have made the search 
too cumbersome. Instead, I focused attention on those coun-
tries which were allegedly taking a lead on climate change in 
Europe. 
237  Due to a lack of German data for the year 1992 I did not 
include the Earth Summit in Rio. Lexis®-Nexis® Executive 
only provides data for the Süddeutsche Zeitung. 
this, it is not clear how frequently the less important 
papers have reported on the issue. In order to avoid 
this problem, I reduced the number of press outlets 
to just one quality broad sheet in each country. Again 
it appears that the German media rates climate 
change more newsworthy than the other two coun-
tries. Taken together, there were 158 reports in the 
FAZ, 118 in the FT, and 83 in the NYT. German 
attention at the Berlin 1995 and Bonn 2001 confer-
ences was far higher compared to the US and UK. 
Germany hosted these two international climate 
conferences and is also the home country to the 
UNFCCC secretariat (neither did the US nor the UK 
host an international climate conference during this 
period). Only in the case of the Kyoto and The 
Hague negotiations did FAZ, FT and NYT report on 
comparable levels. 
If we look specifically at the reporting on these cli-
mate summits, and go back to total aggregated data, it 
emerges again that, apart from Kyoto, German atten-
tion was highest throughout. In contrast, US atten-
tion was low at the time of the Berlin conference, 
then rose for Kyoto, only to fall off for The Hague 
and Bonn. If we look at the establishment press, the 
FAZ dwarfs both FT and NYT—the NYT did not 
pay any attention to Bonn (for reasons of consistency 
I stuck to the search term “climate conference”. The 
NYT did publish eight articles on Bonn, using the 
term “climate treaty”, see table 1-8). 
Apart from the difference in media attention, there is 
a difference in lobbying activities. In the ozone case, 
advocates of strict regulations operating out of the 
US, developed an aggressive campaign at the interna-
tional level via the network of US ambassadors. US 
scientists were sent to other countries in order to 
convince them that there was a scientific case for 
regulations. US environmental groups, in particular 
the NRDC, initiated activities in Europe and Japan 
corresponding to those of the local environmental 
groups, which had to this point remained largely 
passive. In Great Britain this was seen as interference 
in British internal affairs. As Richard Benedick ob-
served: ‘Not until early 1987 did the efforts of some 
US environmentalists in the United Kingdom begin 
to pay off in the form of television interviews, press 
articles, and parliamentary questions about the gov-
ernment’s negative policy. Indeed, these US private 
citizens were so successful that Her Majesty’s Gov-
ernment in April 1987 asked the US Department of 
State to restrain their activities.’ (Benedick 1991: 39). 









Bonn 2001  
(1) European and US news reports on climate (major stories only). Search terms: “clima!" / "klima!". 
Dutch News 3 111 185 121  
German News 297 259 539 727  
Italian News 0 27 5 70  
Spanish News 0 1 0 212  
French News 108 154 334 264  
UK News 114 277 279 167  
Total European  522 829 1342 1561  
US News 160 1640 427 562  
(2) Relative values, selected countries only. Ratio of above data under (1) compared to number of news sources 
(28 German sources, 235 UK sources, and 438 US sources). 
German 
News 
10.61 9.25 19.25 25.96  
UK News 0.49 1.18 1.19 0.71  
US News 0.37 3.74 0.97 1.28  




73 163 196 173  
UK News 58 182 140 99  
US News 70 727 219 190  
(4) Relative values. Ratio of above data (3) compared to number of news sources (28 German sources, 235  UK 
sources, and 438 US sources). 
German 
News 
2.61 5.82 7.00 6.18  
UK News 0.25 0.77 0.60 0.42  
US News 0.16 1.66 0.50 0.43  
(5) Establishment press on Climate Change. Search terms for NYT and FT: "greenhouse!" and place. Search term 
for FAZ: "Treibhaus!". 
FAZ 39 50 22 47  
FT 20 55 24 19  
NYT 3 53 18 9  
(6) News reports (major stories only) on climate conferences in UK News, US News, German News. Search 
terms: “climate conference”/ “Klimakonferenz”. 
German 
News 
102 89 196 62  
UK News 25 23 38 6  
US News 45 110 84 38  
(7) Establishment press on Climate Conferences. Search terms: “climate conference”/“Klimakonferenz”. 
FAZ 31 41 13 33  
FT 6 3 3 0  
NYT 1 5 2 0  
(8) Establishment press on Climate Conferences. Search terms: “climate treaty”/ “Klimakonferenz”. 
FAZ 31 41 13 33  
FT 0 1 0 2  
NYT 0 8 8 8  
      
All searches were limited to the following places and periods: Berlin, 7 March - 8 April 1995; Kyoto, 15 Nov-15 
Dec 1997; The Hague, 1-30 Nov 2000; Bonn, 1-31 July 2001. 
Table 1: Media reports, Source: Lexis®-Nexis® Executive [http://web.lexis-nexis.com/executive/], accessed 3 September 2001 
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Nothing comparable has happened in the climate 
case.238 The embassies seem to have kept quiet, there 
was no need felt to send scientists around the globe 
since the IPCC arguably was set up as a world-wide 
operation to achieve exactly this task. For historical 
reasons, it is obvious that Europe is ill prepared to 
take on a missionary role vis-à-vis the United States 
but has been used to accept the reverse. Moreover, 
there is a lack of European co-ordination during the 
negotiations. Whereas the US represents a coherent 
position in negotiations with the EU, the latter dem-
onstrates the ‘unwieldy (and introspective) morass of 
EU decision making’ (Grubb 1999:112). Last but not 
least, environmentalists thought that they were aiming 
for the same goals across the globe. Too much 
seemed to be taken for granted. The EC may have 
trusted the IPCC to do the job of getting everyone to 
agree to controls and therefore did not try to influ-
ence US policy from the outside. While the split in 
the ranks of the environmentalists is a recent (and 
maybe temporary) phenomenon and anyhow lies 
beyond the scope of this article, I shall focus on the 
role of the IPCC and show how the forging of a 
consensus among scientists was counterproductive. 
Consensus as priority 
By institutionalising international scientific assess-
ments, the architects of the IPCC drew what they 
think to be an essential lesson from the case of the 
ozone layer controversy.239 They tried to arrive at a 
consensus view on the scientific aspects of global 
climate changes, thus forming an ‘epistemic commu-
nity’ (Haas 1992).240 
Apart from other leading scientists such as John 
Houghton and Bert Bolin, Robert Watson played a 
key role in this process. In the beginning of the 1980s 
he perceived that CFC regulations would be ham-
pered by the existence of many differing ozone as-
sessments. At the time there were six different re-
ports on the state of knowledge on ozone. Operating 
under the assumption that scientific uncertainty 
would make regulations more difficult, this could 
only lead to confusion and, above all, it gave the 
                                                          
                                                          
238  This could be one of the reasons why media attention on 
climate change stalled in the early 1990s. Mazur (1998) specu-
lates about the reasons for this drop in media attention with-
out mentioning this possibility. 
239  As has been shown above, climate change assessments were 
already carried out since 1979. However, they have been 
largely confined to the US. It was only after the international 
conference in Villach (1985) that an international assessment 
process was established. 
240  Haas (1992:187-8) defines an epistemic community as ‘a 
knowledge-based network of specialists who share beliefs in 
cause-and-effect relations, validity tests, and underlying princi-
pled values and pursue common policy goals.’ 
opponents of regulations welcome arguments. These 
reports were commissioned by the European Com-
munity, NASA, NAS, UNEP, WMO, and the British 
government. As Watson told me,  
At that stage industry and other people were looking 
rather at the differences than at the commonalities of 
the different studies. So I tried to work with the inter-
national science community toward a single interna-
tional assessment (Author interview with Robert Wat-
son, 21 November 1994). 
Watson successfully led the international scientific 
community to write one single report. The first report 
was published in 1986 with several other reports 
following in 1988, 1989, 1991, and 1994. This report-
ing system provided a mechanism that allowed bring-
ing together all relevant scientists and making them 
agree on a common position. While it is clear that 
these reports were used as scientific legitimisation for 
CFC controls, it is less from clear that they were the 
driving force. There is evidence that rising public 
concern created by a transnational network including 
advocacy scientists was much more important 
(Grundmann 2001). 
The IPCC was founded in November 1988, sailing in 
the waves of enthusiasm created by the successful 
Montreal Protocol, by two UN bodies, UNEP and 
WMO. Its role is to review and assess the published 
scientific literature on climate change, its costs, im-
pacts, and possible policy responses. It also plays a 
role in assessing scientific and technical issues for the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(Shackley 1997). Therefore, the IPCC is modelled 
precisely after the WMO-UNEP assessment reports 
in the ozone case. In both cases, a standardisation 
and orchestration (Elzinga 1995) of scientific knowl-
edge is seen as instrumental to get the right policy 
decisions. This follows a linear or ‘technocratic’ pol-
icy model according to which a scientific consensus 
can be transformed into political decisions.241 
It has been remarked that insofar scientists adhere to 
this view, they must be regarded as rather naïve 
(Shackley and Skodvin 1995). Others have argued 
that the IPCC has primarily served the self-interest of 
the participating scientists in that they attracted huge 
funding resources and therefore stayed away from 
241  Although government representatives nominate scientists to 
be represented in the IPCC and negotiate the wording of the 
executive summaries of the reports, this does not contradict 
the claim that IPCC follows a linear or technocratic model of 
policy consultancy. The fact that government representatives 
nominated the scientists they nominated suggests that they 
themselves intended to make global climate change into a po-
litical issue (O’Riordan et al. 1998: 369). This ‘orchestration of 
consensus’ did not, however, extend to those powerful 
stakeholders and parts of the American public who were hos-
tile to climate change regulations. 
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advocating specific policies (Boehmer-Christiansen 
1995). To this, it has been replied that the avoidance 
of policy advocacy in IPCC reports is rooted in a 
desire to make the scientific information as effective 
as possible: ‘For scientific information to be believed 
by the majority of participants in policy debates, it 
must be even-handed and not favour particular politi-
cal or economic interests’ (Moss 1995). Without 
doubt, the IPCC has succeeded in establishing a 
shared understanding of climate change that is ac-
cepted by many participants involved in building the 
climate change convention, although some powerful 
stakeholders seem unimpressed. But why has it been 
so difficult to implement the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
and the Kyoto Protocol? 
The case of ozone layer protection was different in 
that there was, before the consensus assessment 
reports, strictly speaking, no epistemic community. 
From the beginning, a few advocacy scientists (like F. 
Sherwood Rowland, Mario Molina and, later, Paul 
Crutzen) dared to combine their scientific judgements 
with political recommendations or demands. Row-
land was not afraid to demand first a ban on CFCs in 
spray cans and then, after the discovery of the ozone 
hole in 1985/86, a general ban. Moreover, it was he 
who coined the metaphor of the ozone hole. His 
credibility and that of other advocates grew as time 
passed, particularly after the onset of dramatic events 
in 1985 (the ozone hole). In the 1970s and the begin-
ning of the 1980s, Rowland was considered an ex-
tremist by many colleagues (Roan 1989). In the case 
of climate change the role to be played by advocacy 
scientists was curbed by the deliberate creation of an 
epistemic community. To be sure, back in the 1980s, 
climate researchers Stephen Schneider and James 
Hansen distinguished themselves as advocates of a 
policy of prevention. At public hearings, they did not 
hesitate to describe current extreme climatic events as 
expressions of anthropogenic climate change (most 
famously by James Hansen in the heat wave of 
1988)—for which they were much criticised (cf. 
Nance 1991). With the IPCC, this activity largely 
subsided.242 Climatologists thereby gained an exciting, 
relatively well-funded international research field, but 
at a price: they did not move beyond the boundaries 
                                                          
                                                          
242  What is more, Hansen (Hansen et al. 2000) recently has ex-
pressed some doubts: ‘Dr. Hansen is considered the father of 
the theory of Man-made global warming due to his alarming 
testimony in 1988 before a United States Senate committee. 
Demonstrating a willingness to follow the evidence irrespec-
tive of where it may lead, he recently downplayed the conven-
tional wisdom, which he helped spawn, that CO2 was the pre-
dominant “greenhouse gas”.’ (United Press International, 20 No-
vember 2000). 
of the official consensus. This gave sceptics and out-
siders the opportunity to question the available find-
ings, which they did in public, primarily in the mass 
media (see Gelbspan 1997). So in the end, all at-
tempts at reaching a consensus view notwithstanding, 
debate and controversy could not be avoided. As a 
result, in this game, the IPCC advocates of strong 
reduction goals ironically were disadvantaged since 
fierce enemies of regulation seemed to dominate the 
public debate where they were not attacked by equally 
adamant advocates of regulation but by a consensus 
view that expresses the least common denominator.243 
There is an argument about the difference in both 
cases that pertains to the salience of the threat posed 
by the two cases. Ungar (2000) holds that the ozone 
case represents a ‘hot crisis’ which is perceived by the 
public to have direct effects on their lives, while in 
the case of climate change we only have long-term, 
abstract threats. However, as the preceding paragraph 
has shown, there have been several attempts to link 
extreme weather events to long-term climate change. 
It may be the case that after Hansen’s 1988 statement 
and the formation of the IPCC, ‘reputable scientists 
routinely claim that any extreme … weather season 
cannot be attributed to climate change. Whether 
intentional or not, this dissociation effect has been 
abetted by the media.’ (Ungar 2000: 308). In a differ-
ent study on the US media, Ungar (1999) found no 
correlation between coverage of extreme weather 
events and stories on climate change. The picture in 
Europe is clearly different. In Germany, for example, 
the term climatic catastrophe is current in the mass 
media (Weingart et al. 2000:269), and UK papers 
routinely link extreme weather events to climatic 
change. Incidentally, the flooding of large parts of 
England at the time when negotiators gathered in The 
Hague was very much used by the media to foster 
expectations for a successful outcome of the meeting. 
So there seems to be a difference between the US and 
parts of Europe (mainly Germany) regarding the 
public’s perception of climate change as a ‘hot crisis’. 
The upshot of the argument so far is that it is not 
243  Just one example of how ‘orchestration of consensus’ works in 
practice. Late in 1999 when draft reports of the Third Assess-
ment Report from Working Group II had leaked to the press, 
the co-chairs of Working Group III gave the following advice 
to lead authors for dealing with press inquiries about the draft 
WGIII report: ‘the appropriate response is “no comment.” 
Material in the draft report is embargoed from release to the 
press… For any author to comment to the press at this time 
beyond saying “no comment,” could harm our credibility as 
objective assessors of scientific evidence. Until the review pro-
cess is complete, any public comment on the content of the 
report or on press coverage of our activities can be interpreted 
as personal bias, and could be used by those who are looking 
for evidence to discredit our endeavors.’ (Rob Swart, email to 
lead authors, 3 December 1999). 
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world-wide scientific consensus (or the lack of it), 
which explains the slow progress of the climate 
change policy but the (lack of) media attention in the 
US. From the argument put forward here it follows 
that the key variable in explaining the failure to agree 
to binding targets is the ‘cool’ US public (cf. Grubb 
1999)244 and the absence of advocates of a strong 
treaty who try to change this from outside. If there 
had been public concern about climate change in the 
US, the US delegation would have taken this into 
account at the negotiating table. To counterbalance 
public indifference to global climate change, a public 
discussion about all aspects would have been re-
quired. Recall the analysis provided by Lang accord-
ing to which during the ozone negotiations ‘it was the 
US delegation, which by means of continuous con-
tacts with the media tried to build up a climate of 
public expectations which should induce still reluc-
tant delegations … to agree to substantial reductions 
of emissions.’ (Lang 1994: 175). The consensus-
driven IPCC has inhibited this, precisely because it 
was so successful at consensus building. The fact that 
everyone in The Hague agreed to the science did not 
mean that negotiating a treaty would be easier. 
The case of climate change reveals the limits of the 
technocratic policy model, since reaching a common 
scientific judgement does not necessarily mean that 
the problem can be defined and solved in concert. 
Problem definition is a much broader concept than 
scientific description of a problem; the former con-
tains essential elements of a pragmatic, practical, and 
political dimension, which the latter, as a rule, for-
goes. Yet what is more, as we know from other ex-
amples, scientific knowledge (or the absence of it 
under conditions of uncertainty) has no direct bearing 
on policy outcomes. Ozone is an example where 
prudent political action was taken under uncertainty. 
In the 1970s, CFC regulations were taken on the basis 
of (disputed) model calculations. At the time of signa-
ture of the Montreal Protocol, no commonly ac-
cepted scientific explanation of the ozone hole was 
available. Conversely, in many cases no political ac-
tion follows from conclusive scientific knowledge or 
consensus expert opinion because economic and 
political factors are much more influential. Policy 
                                                          
                                                          
244  As indicated earlier, by public I mean mass media. However, 
there seems to be support for my argument also from poll 
data. Gallup’s March 5-7, 2001 poll asked respondents to 
characterize the amount they worry about 13 different envi-
ronmental issues as either ‘a great deal,’ ‘a fair amount,’ ‘only a 
little’ or ‘not at all.’ Only 33% of Americans told Gallup they 
personally worry about the ‘greenhouse effect’ or global warm-
ing a great deal. However, public concern over climate change 
has been waxing and waning over the years. The figures for 
previous years were: 35% in 1991, 24% in 1997, 28% in 1999 
and 40% in 2000 (www.gallup.com/poll/releases/ 
pr010409.asp). 
makers make use of expert recommendations as they 
see fit. Are scientists deceiving themselves? They 
may, understandably, feel flattered by the role as-
signed to them and many environmentalists may 
think that the IPCC is essentially a ‘good’ thing. 
However, as some powerful players around the globe 
could not influence the composition of this expert 
body they sponsored contrarian scientists. In the end, 
even provided that well-meaning politicians were 
intending to bind themselves to the findings and 
recommendations of IPCC (which seems plausible if 
we follow Elzinga’s analysis in terms of an ‘orchestra-
tion of consensus’), the consensus was not all perva-
sive. It took only a few but powerful stakeholders to 
dominate US public opinion.245 In sum, scientific 
consensus can hardly be seen as the driving force in 
the process of adopting environmental regulations. 
These will be the product of a political process in 
which the public (via the agenda setting function of 
the mass media) has much greater weight. The con-
trarians seem to have understood this much better 
than the architects of the IPCC.246 
Conclusion: Ozone simple, climate complex? 
It would be foolish to downplay the differences of 
both cases. Both developed in historical time which is 
to say that many factors have changed since the sign-
ing of the Montreal Protocol, including the (lower) 
salience of environmental issues on the political 
agenda, the (self-) understanding of science and its 
accomplishments both among the public and the 
political system. However, both cases are path de-
pendent and change our expectations as we move 
along in time. The fact that CFCs were the first class 
of industrially produced chemicals to be banned was 
unthinkable in the 1970s and 80s but now we seem to 
245  The Seattle Weekly (9 July 1997) described the process as 
follows: ‘The Western Fuels Association’s paeans to pollution, 
combined with strong-arm lobbying by oil industry groups 
such as the Global Climate Coalition and pseudo-scientific 
policy papers by conservative think tanks like the Marshall In-
stitute, helped the administration derail international climate-
change negotiations at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Ja-
neiro, Brazil. In the ensuing five years, under relentless fuel-
industry pressure, negotiations have failed to produce any 
solid international commitments to fossil fuel reductions de-
spite the increasingly grave warnings from the scientific com-
munity.’ 
246  An other example is the ‘chapter 8 controversy’ where con-
trarians accused two leading IPCC scientists, Ben Santer and 
Tom Wigley, to have altered parts of the IPCC’s Second As-
sessment Report in order to make it sound more dramatic 
(Seitz 1996; Singer 1996). The fact that they could do so, no 
matter how unjustified their allegations were (cf. Edwards and 
Schneider 2001; Santer at al. 1996) vindicates the fragility of 
the IPCC construction. For the contrarians it was sufficient to 
publicly cast doubt on the integrity of the IPCC. Since the 
public is less interested in the technical details of scientific de-
bates the contrarians scored points (‘mud always sticks’). 
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take it for granted. Therefore, the measures of suc-
cess and failure may also shift in historical time. IPCC 
scientists concentrated their main activity on scientific 
scenarios which are supposed to prove beyond rea-
sonable doubt that climate change is real, human 
made, happening now, and problematic. They have 
been largely successful in doing so, but did not con-
vince some powerful stakeholders who block ambi-
tious GHG reductions. At the same time, the IPCC 
could not quite keep up with the speed of the politi-
cal process which—due to the influence of these 
powerful stakeholders—had moved in the direction 
of exploring a range of ‘flexible measures’. The diffi-
culty to develop reliable and agreed-upon indicators 
(and monitoring instruments) has led to a deadlock in 
The Hague which, for the time being, was resolved in 
Bonn. It is open to speculations how this issue will be 
resolved in future negotiations. 
Popular explanations for the difference between the 
two cases either cite the greater size or complexity of 
the problem of climate change, or how ‘simple’ it was 
to solve the problem of the ozone layer. In retrospect 
it may seem so, in accordance with a functionalist 
logic that declares solved problems to be easily solved 
problems. Upon closer examination, the ozone case 
was anything but simple. For almost twenty years, 
producers of CFCs throughout the world resisted 
regulation, in part by means of the same arguments 
which are still heard in the case of climate: there were, 
they claimed, no cost-effective alternative technolo-
gies. Such technologies came onto the market after 
the producers were forced to forgo the use of CFCs. 
The anti-regulation position was still so strong in 
1987 that six months before the signing of the Mont-
real Protocol, Lang, then chair of the international 
ozone negotiations, claimed that no more than 10 to 
20% CFC reduction was feasible in the next decade 
(New York Times, 28 February 1987).247 
It is sometimes also argued that the greater objective 
importance of greenhouse gases for the world econ-
omy makes it more difficult to curb them (compared 
to the relative small importance of CFCs). The de-
carbonisation of the world economy will amount to a 
radical restructuring of its technical infrastructure. 
However, from the fact that GHGs are more central 
to the economy it does not immediately follow that it is 
more difficult to reduce them. This is a matter of 
technical alternatives, political instruments, economic 
incentives, and public support (Hawken, Lovins and 
Lovins 1999; de Leo et al. 2001). To be sure, the 
                                                          
247  It should be recalled that at the time, the idea of banning an 
entire class of industrially produced chemicals by means of in-
ternational measures was completely outlandish. I am grateful 
to Konrad von Moltke for this suggestion. 
more central a technology is, the more one should 
expect powerful actors to defend it. This is the case 
since the number of potential veto players is likely to 
increase. But there is a reverse side, too: as more 
technical and business opportunities arise, more new 
players will enter the game. Only if it could be shown 
that it is nearly impossible to power the carbon-based 
economy with alternative energy sources would the 
argument of ‘objective importance’ be convincing. 
It is striking how often the argument of the greater 
size and complexity of the problem is advanced—but 
it applies mainly to the reluctant US policy, not across 
the board. Such attempts seem to forget that Europe 
is making good progress in substituting fossil fuels 
with renewable energy sources. This means that the 
size-and-complexity argument does not hold. We are 
led back to the major question, Why has the US been 
so reluctant in taking climate protection seriously? 
There is some truth to the complexity thesis with 
regard to the structure of business in both fields. 
While Du Pont was the market leader, and its change 
of direction set off a chain reaction, this has not 
occurred in the climate case and it is doubtful if it 
can. Here, there is no dominant producer from 
whom all others take their cue. However, European 
oil companies such as BP and Shell have given up 
their obstructive role. For example, in May 1997, 
John Browne of BP announced that the company was 
in favour of gradual reductions in carbon dioxide 
emissions: ‘The time to consider the policy dimen-
sions of climate change is not when the link between 
greenhouse gases and climate change is conclusively 
proven, but when the possibility cannot be dis-
counted and is taken seriously by the society of which 
we are part. We in BP have reached that point’ 
(Browne 1997: 55). BP’s declaration could in any case 
be seen as a sign that oil producers no longer see their 
future exclusively in terms of oil and thus trigger a 
bandwagon effect. 
But the real important difference between the two 
cases is as follows. A strong, publicly visible, transna-
tional policy network that alarmed the world public 
and advocated strict controls decided the ozone con-
troversy. The advocates of regulation owned public 
credibility, the scarcest resource in such controver-
sies. In the climate controversy, however, there were 
no vociferous advocacy scientists acting all the way 
through the debate. What is more, one of the early 
advocates seems to have mellowed down. In a way, 
the early institutionalisation of the epistemic commu-
nity in the form of the IPCC suppressed any open 
controversy, including the creation of a ‘climate of 
expectation’ across territorial borders. In order to 
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preserve a consensus (of which too much was ex-
pected politically), the scientific controversy was 
silenced. This gave outsiders the chance to make their 
name in media and effectively cast doubt on the 
consensus, albeit being condemned as essentially 
unscientific by the IPCC. If all conflicting opinions 
would have been openly aired, then the advocates’ 
justification could have made their case for a serious 
commitment much better—assuming that their 
credibility had increased over the years. 
The construction of the IPCC as an international 
epistemic community committed to a scientific con-
sensus has proven, on this view, to be somewhat 
counterproductive. The drive to establish a scientific 
consensus robbed the controversy of an essential 
dynamic. The gain in public credibility of those advo-
cating for climate protection, above all in the US, has 
not been sufficiently achieved in the climate debate. 
However, this would have been the essential re-
quirement to influence the US position at interna-
tional talks. This is a speculative lesson which follows 
from the above analysis. If plausible, it would put into 
question the main lesson drawn by the architects of 
the IPCC.  
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